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A literature on the «second National Front» (Wieviorka, 2012, p. 35) (hereafter
NF) has developed in political sociology and in politics since Marine Le Pen
took over from her father at the helm of this party in 2011. A number of recent
studies have investigated the changes and continuities between the «first» and
the «second NF» at different levels, including its ideology, policy and voters
(Baubérot, 2012; Dézé, 2012; Mayer, 2013). Despite this growing scholarly at-
tention, empirical studies focusing on party members under the new leadership
are still rare (Crépon, 2012; Stockemer, 2014).
This article provides ethnographic insight into the neglected topic of NF
activism by investigating how party members negotiate the changing party ideo-
logy. More specifically it addresses the relationship between two ideological
components of radical right-wing populism (RRP) in the case of the «second
NF» (Wieviorka, 2012, p. 35): anti-establishment populism on the one hand
and ethno-nativist xenophobia1 on the other (Rydgren, 2007). In the populist
discourse, not only social and political elites are corrupted and excluded from
the national community of the «pure people», but also migrants and ethnic
minorities do. Both are constructed as outsiders threatening the unity of the
nation. Based on ethnographic data, this article analyses how multiple bound-
x
This article is based on research funded by the European Research Council (Starting Grant),
2012-2014. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
1 Rydgren (2007) also mentions socio-cultural authoritarianism (such as conservative
positions on law and order and the family). This definition echoes that of the populist radical
right provided by Cas Mudde (2007), based on its ideological traits: nativism, populism and
authoritarianism. However, the category of populism is controversial. Rydgren (2007) notes
that non-right wing parties can use populism. Collovald (2004) notes that populism is a
problematic notion for social scientists: it is a category used by the very political forces that are
the object of their studies. For instance, in public debate, this category is used to delegitimise
the working-classes as political actors, associating them with irrational xenophobic fears.
FRANCESCA SCRINZI
– 54 –
aries – pertaining to ethnic and political but also class and spatial divides – are
constructed and negotiated in the NF. The biographical interviews reveal how
members of different class background and origins accommodate the construc-
tion of the ethnic and political enemies forged by the party propaganda. In so
doing, the article provides an original contribution to the study of NF member-
ship, by considering the impact of ethnicity and class on activism as well as the
experiences of «paradoxical» members: racialised individuals who have been
attracted by the party’s new «republican» discourse.
The first section of the article presents its methodological strategy. The
second one reviews existing studies of RRP support and activism, while the third
presents existing studies of the NF vote and membership, locating them in the
specifics of the contemporary French economic, social and political context. The
fourth section discusses current debates on the changes and continuities in the
«second NF» and presents the party ideology, focused on constructing a double
enemy of the «people». The fifth and main section of the article presents the re-
search findings, showing how party members of different class background and
origins negotiate the symbolic frames provided by the party at a micro-level2.
The final section discusses the main findings of the article.
1. 1. Methodology
The article is based on life histories collected in a two-year ethnographic study
of NF activism. Biographical interviews were conducted with seventeen (eight
female and nine male) NF activists aged between 19 and 33 who were active
in the Paris area in 2013. All interviewees had joined the NF within the past
few years, after Marine Le Pen took over as leader. Seven held roles in the
party and/or had run as candidates in recent elections; the rest did not have
any formal role but regularly distributed flyers and attended the meetings of
their local party branch or those of the NF youth organisation. A limited sample
of life histories is appropriate to achieving the main purpose of ethnography:
familiarising the researcher with the interviewees’ worldviews and experiences
in the very context of their lives (Bizeul, 2007). Indeed, the interviews were
conducted with NF members whom I regularly met at meetings and actions.
In-depth interviews such as life histories constitute «a window into the everyday
worlds of activists» (Blee, Taylor, 2002, p. 96). The data were used to shed
light on the members’ motivations and strategies, and to locate their political
engagement not only in relation to the external structural context but also to
their agency and processes of interpretation across time (Lafont, 2001).
Negotiations related to establishing contact with interviewees are partic-
ularly delicate in studies of RRP movements, as research participants can ex-
press suspicion and even hostility towards outsiders and especially academic
researchers and journalists. Significant effort and time can be taken up by ne-
x
2  Gender, articulating with class and ethnicity, plays a major role in structuring activism
(Taylor, 1999) including in male-dominated RRP parties (Author, 2014). However for this
article I have chosen to focus on dynamics of ethnicity and class.
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gotiating access: researchers may have to devise strategies such as observing
from the margins of events, underplaying aspects of their identity which may
enhance risk to themselves, elaborating ways of presenting the research object-
ives which may be perceived by the interviewees as less threatening to them
(Blee, 2007) and, in some cases, adopting covert observation methods (Fielding,
1982). However, various scholars report positive experiences of interviewing
RRP activists: while they expected some difficulties in persuading interviewees
to be interviewed, they found that many individuals were cooperative and even
enthusiastic about taking part in the research process, after their first suspicions
had evaporated (Klandermans, Mayer, 2006). After all, RRP activists are keen to
provide a genuine view of their organisation to overcome what they consider to
be discriminatory coverage in the media. Further, recent ethnographic studies
of NF activism suggest that the party is now more open and welcoming vis-à-vis
researchers than it was under its former leader (Crépon, 2012).
My overall experience confirms these remarks. However, the treatment I
received from NF members was strikingly uneven: while many party represent-
atives and activists were helpful and welcoming, others were overtly hostile.
Relationships were sometimes tense when establishing contact with the inter-
viewees, whom I accessed through the party or by approaching them directly,
but during the interviews the atmosphere was mostly relaxed. This supports the
finding that a methodological strategy based on in-depth interviews, such as
life-histories, can help defuse hostility and allow the interviewees to frame their
views in a way which is not threatening to the researcher (Williams, Heikes,
1993). While the uneven treatment I encountered may be partly explained by
the ideological diversity within the party, encompassing more moderate and
more radical positions, as well the local political context of the fieldwork, this
should also be located in the party’s current historical phase. Much is at stake
today for the NF with regard to its public image as a respectable political form-
ation and an organisation which is open and democratic about its objectives
and forms of action. The challenge for the NF is to nurture its anti-establish-
ment extremism, which constitutes a key element in its political identity, while
preventing this becoming an obstacle to political office (Wieviorka, 2012). This
tension was probably particularly acute during the specific timeframe during
which the fieldwork was conducted – in the run-up to the French municipal
and later the European elections in 2014 – thus contributing to exacerbate the
differences between those members who made an effort to be open with me,
and those who had aggressive attitudes. Last but not least, prior to the elections
many of the activists were busy distributing flyers and attending to other tasks,
particularly those who were candidates. The interviews took up a good amount
of the interviewees’ time during a period which was already hectic for them.
2. 2. Studies of RRP vote and activism
Most studies of RRP parties examine their electoral support and ideology: until
recently, they have mainly focused on issues of structure as opposed to agency
and on «external» conditions – demand-side factors such as the structural con-
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text and how this shapes the electoral demand for such parties – as opposed
to the dynamics which are internal to the political organisations (Minkenberg,
1992). Explanations of RRP support have associated this with economic restruc-
turing in post-industrial societies, where industrial (mainly male) workers who
appear as the «losers» of globalisation seek a return to an idealised past (Betz,
1994). The RRP vote is also associated with the cultural deprivation of the work-
ing classes in post-industrial societies, where knowledge and education are
key resources. RRP voters, often low-skilled workers with intermediate levels
of education, can be seen as the «cultural losers of globalisation» (Bornschier,
Kriesi, 2013, p. 27), with their dislike for cultural modernity and universalism
functioning as the driving factor behind their RRP vote. Meanwhile, the worst-off
in terms of education and class do not vote at all. Supply-side factors such as
the parties’ strategies and organisation, including party membership, and the
incentives they provide to promote and sustain activism (Mudde, 2007) have also
been proved to be crucial in RRP dynamics. Indeed the ideological and policy
flexibility of these parties may explain their appeal for working-class voters.
Their emphasis on economic protectionism in the current economic crisis can
be analysed as a deliberate strategy which has proved to be effective (Betz,
Meret, 2013). Furthermore, the activists, who provide the bulk of unpaid volun-
teer work especially during electoral campaigns, are seen as a crucial internal
resource for RRP parties (Stockemer, 2014).
In contrast, only a minority of ethnographic studies of the RRP focus on
the micro-dynamics of activism. Developing as a result of a growing articula-
tion between the sociology of the RRP and the sociology of social movements,
however, there has been a recent increase in empirical studies focusing on the
RRP. This literature focuses on processes of interpretation and the experiences
and trajectories of activists, showing that the activists’ group provides members
with structures of sense which they appropriate and negotiate in original ways
to make sense of their political engagement and of their lives, and addressing
how individual and collective identities such as Us versus the racialised Other
are constructed through activism (Blee, 2007). The role played by emotions in
social movements is central to construct and strengthen collective identities:
political organisations manipulate their members’ emotions by training them to
fear the outside world and create an enemy (Berezin, 2007; Blee, 2002; Crépon,
2012; Stockemer, 2014; Goodwin, 2011). Belonging to the activists’ group and
to the nation thus emerges as membership of a «community of victims» (Bizeul,
2003, p. 19; Dematteo, 2007). The experience or the perception of stigmatisation
by outsiders – which is directly linked to the RRP anti-immigration agenda and
discourse – is a key element in the experiences of these activists (Klandermans,
Mayer, 2006).
Ethnographic studies of RRP activism have also led to the development of
typologies of members’ trajectories and motives: some have deep-rooted ideo-
logical ethno-nativist views and motives and look for a group in which to express
their views, while others are individuals with less strongly entrenched values,
who are driven by the perceived costs and benefits of activism (Klandermans,
Mayer, 2006). «Compliant» (Linden, Klandermans, 2007) members have few
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ideological motives for joining and do not feel a strong sense of belonging to the
group; rather, they predominately identify with other individuals in the move-
ment, with whom they can maintain a relationship through affiliation. Finally,
existing studies indicate that many RRP activists are politically socialised into
xenophobic and populist worldviews by their families (Klandermans, Mayer,
2006). Generational differences interplay with class and gender to shape polit-
ical socialisation – taking place in the family as well as in other sites such as
religious or sport groups. The family transmits moral as well as political atti-
tudes to younger generations, which may include the sense of national belong-
ing (Percheron, 1993). The analysis of age and political behaviour relies on the
distinction between biographical age, generation (the commonalities in terms
of political socialisation shared by the members of a generation) and period
(the historical events shaping individual political experiences) (Muxel, 2011;
Percheron, 1991): belonging to the same generation thus impacts on the way
in which an activists’ cohort is socialised into politics. Today, youth political so-
cialisation is located in a scenario where economic cleavages are losing ground
to the advantage of identity cleavages in structuring political conflict and where
there is growing disaffection regarding political institutions (Gougou, Mayer,
2013).
3. 3. The NF: support and party membership
There is evidence of growing working-class support for the RRP across Europe,
including for the NF (Rydgren, 2013). Low-income NF voters, especially those
living in suburban areas3, where the NF appears to have gained support in recent
elections, are currently under the media spotlight. Sociological studies however
point to the fact that abstention is the «first party» of the French working classes;
in addition, this hyper-visibilisation of working-class voters combines with the
fact that NF voters of other social classes remain invisible (Collovald, 2004).
Further, this representation obscures the complex socio-economic and political
changes in post-industrial France, involving increasing precariousness and the
crisis of working-class collective identities and forms of sociability (Emmeneg-
ger et al., 2012) as well the growing presence of migrants and «second-gener-
ation migrants» in stigmatised suburbs. In this context, marked by a racialisa-
tion of social relations, postcolonial migrants and their children are highly ex-
posed to unemployment and discrimination at work (Wieviorka, 1993). The NF
voters living in suburban areas correspond to an upper fraction of the working
classes. These «low-means» households moved to the suburbs at a time when
this represented a form of upward social and residential mobility; aspiring to
social respectability, they fear the arrival of poorer racialised «newcomers» or
neighbours (Cartier et al., 2008; Mayer, 2014).
However, some ethnographic studies nuance the generalising picture of an
«ethnic competition» at the core of social and political processes in the suburbs
x
3 Debates focus specifically on the statistical «periurban» category: socially diverse areas
which are distant from large cities but within their sphere of influence.
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by providing evidence of concrete forms of solidarity, including in the workplace
(Beaud, Pialoux, 2006). The growing working-class support for the NF can be
read also as a result of the strategies deployed by the party. This NF has mo-
bilised widespread ideas of cultural Otherness and fears concerning the ethnic-
ally stigmatised youth (often referred to using the derogative term racaille) in
suburban areas (Cartier et al., 2008). Finally, other studies have pointed to the
important role played by other political actors such as the media: the feeling of
being a white minority threatened by an overwhelming majority of racialised
«newcomers» needs to be located within a context where «ethnic riots» and acts
of violence in deprived suburbs are intensely mediatised (Macé, Peralva, 2005).
Thus the antagonism between the working classes and the stigmatised
(working-class) ethnic minorities is largely a social construction brought about
by academics, think tank experts and the media. Nonetheless, in this context
a new «triangular» working-class form of identification is emerging, centred
on the negative identification of the working classes vis-a-vis both the middle
classes located above them and those (the migrants and racialised working
classes) who are located below (Schwartz, 2009). In this situation, poverty and
precariousness do not create the perception of a collective destiny and the sense
of belonging to one class; instead, social antagonism is expressed along ethnic
lines. Post-industrial change has profoundly reshaped class relations, through a
massive transfer of manual jobs from industry to the service sector and through
increasing levels of education as well as of unemployment and economic pre-
cariousness. Today, the working classes, defined by economic and cultural dis-
advantage, include blue-collar workers and non-skilled lower-level employees
in the service sector. While many industrial jobs are highly precarious, some
manual workers have managed to negotiate a social and professional mobil-
ity and to access housing property in suburban areas (Collet et al., 2012). In
this context, the contemporary working classes experience a distance from the
middle classes endowed with socially-valued cultural resources as well as from
the precarious «newcomers», fearing the downgrade in social mobility associ-
ated with the latter’s arrival in the suburbs.
Ethnographic studies of NF members4 largely focus on issues of identity
and point to experiences or perceptions of stigmatisation and victimhood, which
are paramount among them (Klandermans, Mayer, 2006). The party is exper-
ienced by its members as an internally cohesive community which counters
and is reproduced by stigmatisation by political and ethnic outsiders, serving
as a space for members to openly express their views and emotions (Bizeul,
2003). Stigmatisation may be the result of political engagement rather than its
cause, as NF activism does not necessarily originate from individual alienation
and isolation (Lafont, 2001). Even under the new «republican» party line, NF
members express a racialised view of national belonging (Crépon, 2012; Stock-
emer, 2014), as the identification with the French nation constantly implies and
is sustained by the stigmatisation of postcolonial migrants and their children.
x
4  According to official party figures, there are 60.000 members, mostly men. Working-class
members have increased from the late 1990s (Stockemer, 2014).
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NF affiliation has different meanings for different generations of activists who
joined in different phases of the party’s history (Lafont, 2001; Boumaza, 2004).
Finally, some data – albeit limited – are available which shed light on how ethni-
city impacts on NF membership and affiliation. Crépon (2012) and Lafont (2000)
provide some insight into the experiences of NF activists of European migrant
descent, but not of racialised members of non-European descent. Orfali (2011,
p. 99) draws on social psychology to analyse the «paradoxical affiliation» of
racialised individuals who choose to identify with a stigmatised (political) group
such as the NF: by choosing to associate themselves with a stigmatised politic-
al movement, they aim at neutralising the passive stigmatisation they endure
because of their origins.
4. 4. The double enemy of the NF
Marine Le Pen has re-framed the anti-immigration agenda of the party by appro-
priating a republican repertoire and emphasising secularism (Baubérot, 2012).
The project of normalising the party image was initiated by Bruno Mégret and
then taken up by a group of younger party members, including Le Pen herself,
at the start of the 2000s. They pushed for a greater focus on the necessity of a
«French Islam» and of a policy of assimilation into the Republic. The «republic-
anisation» (Shields, 2013) of the NF discourse and its breaking away from the
anti-egalitarian tradition typical of the French far right has enraged older gen-
erations of members, many of whom either quit the party or were marginalised.
Similarly, the adoption of more liberal positions on issues of gender, sexuality
and the family aims at building a consensus among younger French generations
(Scrinzi, 2014). Discontented with Marine Le Pen’s declaration that she will
not abrogate the right to abortion and with her tolerant attitude on same-sex
unions, the party’s Catholic fraction has rallied around her former leadership
rival Bruno Gollnisch.
While pointing to these significant ideological changes, existing studies in-
dicate that there are substantial continuities with the «first NF». The NF anti-im-
migration discourse is re-framed through reference to a struggle against radical
Islam and the cultural sectarianism (communautarisme) of the ethnic minorities
which are claimed to threaten the unity of the Republic. However, the NF’s «re-
publican» discourse retains a racialised conception of citizenship and the nation
and stigmatises migrants and Muslims (Dézé, 2012). Secularism is considered
as a legacy of Christianity and a value that is specific to the French culture
(Crépon, 2012). Further continuities in the party programme are exemplified by
the resilient principle of «national preference» in access to welfare services and
jobs, though this has been renamed as «national priority». The 2012 presiden-
tial campaign also saw a new emphasis on (exclusionary) redistributive policies
to attract the working classes. Unlike her father, Marine Le Pen argues for a
strong role for the State in the context of the economic crisis and the need for
more public services, presenting herself as the defender of the workers and
the «forgotten of France». Party propaganda tends to portray the «people» as
victims: the wrongdoers appear to be the national mainstream parties and in-
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ternational economic elites as well as migrants and radical Islam. The NF also
claims that there is a functional relationship between these two sets of enemies,
whereby each receives support from the other. These views are expressed in the
party programme. Here, the threat constituted by the racialised Other is directly
associated with the political and cultural dominance of the mainstream parties5
which – it is claimed – have promoted massive immigration and «anti-patriotic»
policies promoting «multiculturalism»:
In France, […] the left-wing and right-wing political elites have imported this
model [of multiculturalism] and called it «diversity politics», which is a new
name for the policy of advantaging migrants that has been implemented for
over thirty years. (http://www.frontnational.com/le-projet-de-marine-le-pen/
refondation-republicaine/laicite/)
According to the NF, the immigration policies implemented by mainstream
parties have attracted a massive level of immigration, which is leading to the col-
lapse of the national Welfare state system and the fragmentation of the Republic,
establishing an Anglo-Saxon «multicultural» model of integration. In turn this
model of integration is depicted as leading France to social fragmentation and
cultural ruin. Opposed to this is the French republican model of integration,
based on secularism and the assimilation of migrants’ cultural specificities. In
this representation, the French political elites are the allies of non-national
and anti-patriotic political and economic forces which foster globalisation and
cultural homogenisation worldwide. The French model of integration must be
restored to counter the vituperative multiculturalist model. Thus the NF propa-
ganda conjures a triple (class, political and ethnic) boundary between the cor-
rupted elites, the patriots deserving social mobility and the racialised poors who
are deviant, dangerous and «welfare-parasites».
5. 5. Whose victims? Narratives and identity
among middle-class and working-class NF members
The interviews show how activists belonging to different social groups negoti-
ate the party discourse concerning the two enemies of the nation, and mobil-
ise these representations to make sense of their political engagement and of
the difficulties encountered in their lives. The interviewees’ narratives were
analysed according to three criteria: whether the activists mainly identified
negatively with the enemy above or with the enemy below; what were their
declared motives for joining the NF; and the arguments they used against im-
migration.
x
5 «UMPS» is the expression used by the NF to signify that the French mainstream right-wing
UMP (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire) and the left-wing PS (Parti Socialiste) have the
same objectives and policy. This is consistent with the claim that the NF is neither a right-wing
nor a left-wing party as these political divides are obsolete.
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5.1. 5.1. White middle-class NF members
Most of these activists tended to consider the political elites as the main enemy
of the nation while underplaying the threat constituted by the enemy below.
At the time of the interviews, four of these interviewees were involved in an
upward political career in the NF. All were higher education students: one had a
university degree, three were attending university and another two were study-
ing at nursing schools. Except for one, these interviewees expressed a strong
identification with the Republic and the values associated with it, such as solid-
arity (fraternité); they used neo-Gaullist arguments to explain why they joined
the party, such as patriotism and national sovereignty. They mentioned the lack
of democracy affecting France as one of the main motives which induced them
to take an interest in the NF. For example, Mathieu reported negative experi-
ences at school and at university, which he felt were dominated by a left-wing
ideological monopoly: it was impossible to have a real debate over issues of
immigration with his teachers and fellow students, and that his right to express
his ideas was refused. Other activists reported that the first political event to
have an impact on them was the demonstrations against the NF in 2002, when
Jean-Marie Le Pen went to ballot at the presidential elections; they told me how
the discussions over this at school had induced them to sympathise with the NF.
The anti-immigration discourse of these interviewees was polished and
exempt of references to ethno-nativist arguments. They never attacked migrants
as the main enemy. Rather, they attacked political forces as well as economic
actors and processes threatening French national sovereignty such as neolib-
eral capitalism, globalisation, the «banksters»6 and the European Union (EU).
Sylvie did not even mention the issue of immigration; instead, she insisted on
attacking EU policies which – she claimed – had led to the impoverishment of
the middle-classes, with which she explicitly identified. She said that a sense of
injustice had moved her since she was a child and eventually led her to joining
the party.
I have always been very touched by injustice […] for example I found that there
were school mates who did not even have the money to buy decent food, this
kind of things deeply move me and it is this feeling that the victims of injustice
are always the same people, the middle classes, that induced me to join the NF.
[…] I have grown up with the EU and with the impoverishment of the middle
classes. (Sylvie, female interviewee)
These activists also attacked the French mainstream parties, criticising
their policies, their anti-democratic nature and self-interested attitude. Mathieu
reported a negative experience concerning his short participation in a regional
youth organisation set up by the local institutions. Instead of providing the youth
with a space to express and discuss their ideas to make a change in society,
x
6 A blend of «banker» and «gangster» coined in the 1930s and used by fascist movements
as a pejorative term for high financiers. It is now used by the NF.
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he saw the actions of this local organisation as a means used by local left-wing
politicians for indoctrinating young voters.
The political elites – particularly the Socialist Party – and their ideological
and political influence were also spatially located by these interviewees in the
Left Bank or other wealthy Paris areas. For example, Sophie benefited from a
bursary to study at one of the most prestigious academic institutions in France.
However, she never identified with her university social environment and later
on with her colleagues. She defined her workplace as upper middle-class and
left-wing and expressed anger at the social disdain that, in her view, her upper
middle-classes fellow students and colleagues expressed for uneducated work-
ers; she identified with the latter in moral terms, condemning the patronising
attitude of the bobos7. She joined the party at a time when she was feeling deeply
unsatisfied with her job, which she found socially useless. In politics she thus
found a sense of satisfaction which she had never experienced at work, and was
able to use the skills she had acquired at university in her activism. In the NF,
she found the values embodied and taught to her by her parents: righteousness;
coherence and connection to reality; hard work aimed at achieving socially use-
ful objectives as opposed to hedonistic consumerism; patriotism and love for the
«people» as opposed to arrogant middle-class disdain.
I could no longer stand the contradiction, being among people who define
themselves as «open to the poor» and promoted multiculturalism, but who
actually all live in the same well-to-do area of the city… they consider them-
selves Marxists but they have iPhones and iPads and all that and they refu-
se to take the suburban train. I live in the suburbs, I see how people live
there… I see the real life and these people live like in a myth. Also they
are moralising, they always lecture the others about how they should think
and talk. They say they are interested in the poors but as soon as they see
that the poors do not think like them, they despise them. (Sophie, female in-
terviewee)
Similarly, Mathieu described the bobos living in certain areas of Paris as
people who are disconnected from reality and generally hostile to the NF. Con-
versely, he described poorer areas of the city largely inhabited by migrants and
their children as more welcoming for NF activists. Thus he emphasised that
the NF is a workers’ party while avoiding an ethno-nativist discourse. Acting
as a coordinator for local activities such as distributing flyers, he provocatively
instructed the new recruits on the neighbourhoods where they would find hos-
tility from passers-by.
When there is a new member I ask him or her to distribute flyers in different
areas of the city. First I take the new member to Gare du Nord, where s/he
arrives all trembling: it is the «station of crime», I hear frightening things
about it… But there s/he is very well received. Then I take the new member
x
7 «Bourgeois bohemians», indicating the radical chic middle classes.
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to St-Germain-des-Près and s/he would say: oh, it should be easy here… but
there s/he is rubbished! [He laughs]. (Mathieu, male interviewee)
Christine, who lived in one of the wealthy areas of the city, expressed
disdain for her own middle-class conservative Catholic milieu: here, she said,
everybody (including her family and school fellows) would regard her with dis-
comfort and even hostility when she declared her sympathy for the NF. She
described her own social milieu as intolerant whereas she perceived the NF
as welcoming and inclusive. Like Sylvie, she never mentioned the issue of im-
migration in her narrative; instead, she shared the concern expressed by the
party over social issues such as the family. Christine had taken part in a recent
demonstration against the French law establishing same-sex marriage together
with her friends, who like her were former members of Catholic youth groups.
However, she did not remain involved in this mobilisation: she ridiculed the oth-
er participants as privileged and spoiled young people who were using politics
to have fun instead of taking it seriously. Her affiliation to the NF can be seen as
an act of rebellion against her own social background: as she says, joining the
NF was the ultimate anti-conformist act in her milieu, where everybody votes for
the conservative right-wing party UMP (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire).
Only one white middle-class interviewee, Maxime, held a different kind of
discourse. His parents had some sympathy for the Socialist Party and did not
approve of their son’s political engagement. His maternal grandfather however
had always been a NF supporter and had fought in Algeria; he also had a house
in the countryside. Maxime, in explaining his NF affiliation, spoke about an
idealised rural past – the France of his grandparents in the 1950s and 1960s
– when the French cultural identity was not threatened and the national eco-
nomy was solid. Further, Maxime strongly and explicitly identified vis-à-vis the
enemy below while he rarely attacked the political elites. Before joining the NF,
he had supported the UMP. In the interview he clearly defined his family as
middle-class and took a distance from the working-class ethnic minority youth
whom he met at school and while practicing sport in his neighbourhood. In his
narrative, the racialised Other was also spatially located: he clarified that he
lived in small single-family house (pavillon) and spoke about the «social hous-
ing youth» (jeunes des cités) as his social antagonists. He explained the motiv-
ation for his affiliation with the NF via his experience of belonging to a white
middle-class minority in a suburban neighbourhood. Unlike the narratives of
other middle-class activists, his narrative centrally revolved around the threat
represented not by political elites but by the racialised Other – the enemy below.
He described this as aggressive and threatening both physically and culturally
– for example, he was enraged by the fact that some of his school mates spoke
Arabic at school. He perceived himself as a victim of massive immigration, of
cultural sectarianism and of anti-white racism.
I have played football and tennis for a long time and then I quit football because
at some point I took a distance from my football friends, they all came from
social housing blocks… as you grow up you inevitably become estranged,
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because we don’t belong to the same social background […] so I focused on
tennis because there I found people who belonged to the same class as I […]
to be clear about it, those who are white and middle-class in the suburbs are
a minority. So, I was the minority. Also at school there are people who say:
I don’t love France, we are here for the money, long live Morocco! Long live
Algeria! […] This is why I have become a patriot, as a reaction against these
populations who are non-assimilated and whom I live with in the suburbs.
(Maxime, male interviewee)
Unlike other white middle-class interviewees, Maxime defined himself as a
monarchist. He declared that he had joined the NF, which he saw as a republican
party, despite this in order to improve the despicable state of the country. He re-
futed democracy, expressing the beliefs that innate intellectual and moral qual-
ities justify social inequalities and that not everybody is equipped for politics. For
example, he saw manual workers and women as being unfit for the complex ne-
gotiations and sophisticated discussions which are needed in politics. Paradox-
ically, however, his identifying as a white middle-class man did not seem to be as-
sociated with a great confidence in his own skills. Maxime did not express a sense
of self-fulfilment through his activism and, although he stated he would like to
pursue a political career, he did not see himself as someone who could do well in
what he called «intellectual» party roles: he described himself as a «hands-on
activist» who would devote himself to action (for instance by distributing flyers
and making decisions on the ground). He did not feel that his higher education
provided him with skills that would be useful to him in his activism. Indeed, he
expressed a lack of interest in his studies and was unsure about his educational
choices. Activism seemed to appear to him more as an intriguing alternative to
the dullness of the university experience than as a passion in itself. Nonetheless,
he ended up running as a candidate in the municipal elections. His affiliation ap-
peared as an act of bravado and rebellion against his family, against the wider so-
ciety which stigmatises the party and even against the republican ideology of the
«second NF». Maxime was nostalgically attached to the values and worldviews of
an older generation of NF activists, whose political socialisation was significantly
affected by the Algerian war (Boumaza, 2004), as opposed to his parents’ gener-
ation, marked by May 1968. Maxime was the only interviewee in this group who
held political views that were strikingly different from those held by his parents.
5.2. 5.2. Racialised working-class NF members
The second group of interviewees comprised five working-class racialised indi-
viduals of African and Northern African origins. Some of them held bachelor
degrees while others were engaged in higher education, either at university
or at colleges delivering professional certifications. Their parents belonged to
the upper fractions of the working classes; they invested in their education but
struggled to combine their studies with precarious jobs (as cashiers, distribut-
ing magazines, etc.). These activists identified themselves as the victims of the
political elites and declared an attachment to the party’s new economic agenda,
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mentioning issues such as the unfair taxes introduced by the Socialist Party, the
struggle against unemployment and labour precariousness, and moving out of
the euro zone. Jean, who had voted for the Socialist Party before joining the NF,
placed particular emphasis on issues of the economy and social justice.
I joined the NF because I no longer want to support the political elites who
want to pursue their noxious policy of austerity and precariousness. Because
you can see that there are loads of people in the streets who suffer. This is a real
problem […] and the NF helps the poor to live in a better world. For example
something that I like very much in its programme is the idea of increasing all
the salaries which are below the minimum wage. (Jean, male interviewee)
While Jean overtly attacked the enemy above on the basis of economic
arguments, he also took a distance from the racialised poors located below
him, in common with other interviewees in this group. Their anti-immigration
arguments revolved partly around exclusionary redistributive policies targeted
at those migrants who are seen as an economic threat. As Jean put it:
The NF defends values such as helping one’s fellows who are in difficulties
before helping those who come from outside. (Jean, male interviewee)
These interviewees attacked the enemy below not only an economic threat
to the nation, but also as a cultural threat. They distinguished between a «pat-
riotic immigration» (involving people willing to assimilate into the Republic) on
the one hand, and an immigration leading to cultural sectarianism on the other.
They strongly identified with the new «republicanised» discourse of the NF. Dis-
tancing themselves from ethnically marked and stigmatised neighbourhoods,
inhabited by people who they described as prone to cultural sectarianism, was
a prominent narrative strategy. These interviewees mobilised a spatial division
in order to negatively identify with the enemy below: they made a distinction
between property-owners and social housing inhabitants, between the city and
the suburbs or between different areas in the suburbs. When explaining where
they lived, they stressed that their place of residence was a rather well-off area
of the suburbs, making it clear that they did not live in the social housing blocks.
They told me that they feared migrants or people of migrant background moving
to their neighbourhood and, in some cases, interviewees’ families had moved
house to avoid the growing insecurity and acts of incivility which they associated
with the increasing number of migrant inhabitants in their area. For instance,
François emphasised that successful assimilation depended on migrants’ access
to housing property: his parents had managed to achieve full assimilation thanks
to the fact that they lived in their own apartment, in an area away from the de-
prived suburbs. He compared his family’s successful assimilation with the cul-
tural separatism of an area near his current suburban place of residence, which
he said was in the hands of the Turkish migrants, where the practice of speaking
Turkish was widespread in public spaces and all shop signs were in Turkish.
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At the same time, these interviewees also described migrants and their
children as victims of the political elites and their immigration policies. In this
respect, they argued that some migrants are likely to be attracted by the NF
because they are the ones primarily affected by economic precariousness and
insecurity in the suburbs where they live.
We don’t say that we have to stop immigration, we say that we need to regulate
immigration. […] We want to bring here patriot migrants who want to devote
themselves to the wealth of France, who can earn a salary, who can buy a
house and get an education thus eschewing economic difficulties and problems
related to crime. Because we have to be honest, when there are migrants
coming to France, they will live in unhealthy social housing blocks, will have
problems with crime, like it happens in Roma camps. When the French watch
all these problems of crime, precariousness, immigration on their TV they
watch them live six minutes after they were filmed by TV cameras. But the
migrants who live in their social housing blocks, who live in precarious and
unhealthy conditions, they live that situation all the time, minute by minute.
And this is why there is a growing number of migrants who join the NF.
(Jonathan, male interviewee)
These interviewees were young people inhabited by feelings of frustration,
struggling to start their adult lives in a context of reduced employment prospects.
Their political socialisation is located in a scenario where economic cleavages
are losing ground to the advantage of identity cleavages in structuring politic-
al conflict (Gougou, Mayer, 2013). They belonged to an upper fraction of the
working class which perceives the «newcomers» as the cause of the degrada-
tion of their living environment and working conditions. Their engagement was
situated in the context of the «republicanised» NF. The party provides them
with cognitive frames to express their feelings of injustice vis-à-vis a double
class/ethnic stigma and to make sense of acts of violence which they fear in
their neighbourhoods. Their «paradoxical affiliation» (Orfali, 2011) material-
ises the central ambivalence of this «republican» discourse. Through choosing
to belong to what they perceive as an unfairly stigmatised political formation,
they attempted to neutralise the ethnic and territorial stigma affecting suburban
working-class youth and Muslims.
5.3. 5.3. White working-class NF members
The third group of interviewees was composed of six white working-class indi-
viduals (two women and four men), including some of European migrant back-
ground. None of these activists held higher education degrees but many held
professional degrees. Two had had to quit university because of economic diffi-
culties or because they failed their studies; three were unemployed at the time of
the interview and another two held precarious jobs. Two interviewees had run or
were running as candidates at the time of the interview. Their narratives reson-
ated with ideas of victimhood and injustice perpetrated by the two enemies of the
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nation but they mainly identified negatively with the enemy below and overtly
attacked migrants and their children. Just like racialised working-class inter-
viewees, they mobilised a spatial division to negatively identify with the enemy
below, taking a distance from social housing inhabitants. These interviewees
depicted immigration both as an economic and a cultural threat. However, un-
like the racialised working-class interviewees, many of them stressed that im-
migration also constitutes a physical threat, associating it with crime and acts
of violence. For example, Jeanne expressed fear of aggressions by the racialised
Other and Michel reported his personal experience of having been attacked and
robbed by «migrants» in his neighbourhood. The specificity of their anti-immig-
ration arguments was that, in their narratives, the racialised Other was seen
as the agent of anti-white racism; these interviewees identify as members of a
white minority whose very existence is threatened by immigration.
This area has more social housing than normal housing. It is mainly social
housing blocks inhabited by migrants, immigration is out of control. […] And
because France is a very generous country when it comes to providing financial
assistance, such as unemployment benefits, inevitably it is like an Eldorado.
There has been a progressive replacement of the population […]. [The former
inhabitants] are moving out of the neighbourhood and they are replaced by
migrants. (Marc, male interviewee)
Jeanne and Eric, who had spent time abroad before they joined the NF,
described their return to France as the marking event leading to affiliation.
Upon their return, in a situation where they had to start their lives over again
and find jobs, they experienced France as an unwelcoming and unsafe place, a
country with which they felt no longer familiar. They identified their uneasiness
with the presence of the racialised Other in public spaces. Jeanne emphasised
the relevance of law and order issues to her motives for joining the NF; her
activism was also motived by a deep sense of the injustice caused by the migrant
«welfare-scroungers». She told me she had personally experienced the extent
of these problems in France while working at a pharmacy in a suburban area,
which had been robbed by individuals of African origins. According to her,
migrant clients used fake prescriptions to buy medicines which they would then
sell at high prices on the black market back in their home country.
6. 6. Conclusion
The NF propaganda aims at presenting itself as the only party defending the
French workers against the «scroungers» located both above and below them.
This construction of the outsiders/enemies of the nation combines political Oth-
erness with ethnic Otherness and is located in the context of class restructuring
and changes in working-class forms of identification. While the data concur with
existing studies in pointing to the central experience of stigmatisation in RRP
activists’ experiences, it appears that the members’ identification vis-à-vis the
two enemies of the «people» is shaped by multiple social relations. The data
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showed that various groups of interviewees differently experienced stigmatisa-
tion by the outsiders and that they stigmatised the racialised Other on the basis
of diverse arguments. The biographical approach was used to shed light on the
relationships between the activists (micro-level), the party (meso-level) and the
structural context (macro-level) (Sawicki, Siméant, 2009). Thus the article has
contributed to advancing existing studies by exploring the impact of ethnicity
and class on affiliation and the experiences of RRP activists.
Middle-class white interviewees identified mainly vis-à-vis the enemy
above, with immigration appearing to be only one of the themes at stake in their
vision of the NF’s politics. In their view, the «problem» of immigration origin-
ates from a lack of democracy (mainstream parties’ policies, exclusion of the
NF from institutional politics) and from macro-processes such as globalisation.
These activists expressed a strong sense of injustice for being moralised at by
the upper-middle classes and stigmatised as racists; in opposition to this, they
claimed to have an ideological proximity with the working-classes. One white
middle-class activist strongly identified negatively against the racialised Other
located below; perceiving himself as a member of a white ethnic minority, he
held an explicitly ethno-nativist discourse focusing on immigration as a cultural
and physical threat. Altogether, this first group of interviewees seemed to be
willing to seize the potential offered by activism to make a change, participate
in self-fulfilling activity, pursue a career opportunity, or to express rebellion
against one’s social environment.
Racialised working-class members identified in relation to both enemies;
their narratives were characterised by an emphasis on their own assimilation
as opposed to that of other migrants, thus constructing the racialised Others
as cultural sectarians. The «undeserving poors» located below were also per-
ceived as «welfare scroungers» and consequently as an economic threat to the
nation. At the same time, paradoxically, migrants were also seen as the victims
of the immigration policies implemented by the political elites. The fact that
racialised individuals join an RRP party should be understood in the context of
the pursuit of social mobility by an upper section of the migrant-background
working classes. These «paradoxical» activists identified with a group that made
them feel recognised and through which they could express their own feelings
of injustice and fear, in an attempt to dissociate themselves from the ethnic and
spatial stigma assigned to them.
White working-class members also identified negatively in relation to both
enemies. They experienced the activists’ group as a cohesive group of people
who were distant from the stigmatising view of the NF as evil. Their narrat-
ives were characterised by the representation of the enemy below as a physical
threat, as well as a cultural and economic threat: anti-white racism was widely
attributed to the racialised Other. The NF provided these members with a sym-
bolic framework which enabled them to make sense of aggressions, incivilities
or lack of services which they experienced in their neighbourhoods. These in-
terviewees not only expressed resentment for being treated as racists but also
fear in terms of belonging to a perceived (white) endangered minority.
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In exploring how ethnic, class, political and spatial boundaries are pro-
duced in NF activism, this article has provided insight into the fluctuating defin-
itions of the «people» versus its enemies at the heart of contemporary popu-
lism. Recent scholarship notes that today’s populisms are characterised by the
high flexibility of the definitions of the enemies of the «people» (Liogier, 2013).
Old and new populisms share an emphasis on the outsider threatening Us and
«our» culture. However, the cultural contents and values that contemporary
RRP parties claim to defend are defined in diverse ways according to different
contexts and audiences: the RRP ideology is becoming increasingly flexible as
these parties mobilise arguments which were once the monopoly of progressive
movements, such as gender equality and gay rights (Scrinzi, 2014). In this way,
RRP propaganda can appeal to individuals who are differently positioned in
social relations and who hold very different worldviews.
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